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Summary
In this talk we provide further support for the claim that having a model with only the classic Common Ground is insufficient for capturing various conversational phenomena involving discourse update. In order to achieve this, we analyze the interpretative properties of a construction containing a non-truth conditional non-core dative, termed the Discursive Dative (DD) giving rise to a mirativity effect. We trace the source of this effect to a particular discourse update where the state of affairs denoted by the prejacent is not compatible with a set of backgrounded objective norms, and therefore is expected not to occur.
Discourse update at the service of mirativity effects: the case of the Discursive Dative

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Main claims and Background. The purpose of this talk is to provide further support for the claim that having a model with only the classic Common Ground (CG) introduced by Karttunen (1974), Lewis (1979) and Stalnaker (1978), is insufficient for capturing various conversational phenomena (other reasons for making such a claim were provided by inter alia Portner 2004, 2007, Farkas & Bruce 2009, Murray 2014). The empirical motivation for the current proposal comes from an examination of a phenomenon in Hebrew (but not restricted to it, e.g. French, some dialects of German), with a construction containing a non-truth conditional non-core dative, termed the Discursive Dative (DD):

(1) hu lo lakax li_{DD} 'et ha-trufa!
   he NEG took to.me ACC the-medicine
   'He didn't take his medicine. That's weird!'

The use of the dative in (1) relies on the knowledge that the relevant person is following a medical treatment, and the deontic generalization that in the relevant case people take the medicine prescribed to them. Thus, the fact expressed in (1), is an exception to this deontic generalization, while the generalization itself still holds true. The DD, accordingly, is a discourse management device (cf. Krifka 2008, Repp 2013 and Murray 2014), indicating that the asserted proposition constitutes an exception to a generalization, assumed by the speaker, to be available to the speech event participants. Providing a discourse update analysis for the DD construction explains a hitherto unresolved issue pertaining to this type of non-core dative construction. Previous studies Berman 1982, Borer & Grodzinsky 1986, Ariel et al. 2015) characterize what we call the DD as an Ethical Dative (ED), whose function is to express the speaker’s stance towards the underlying proposition, usually the speaker’s surprise or irritation concerning the content of the proposition. Namely, a mirativity effect seems to be available here (cf. Juitteau & Rezac 2007 (French); Gutzmann 2007 (German); Rákosi 2008 (Hungarian); Michelioudakis & Kapogianni 2013 (Modern Greek), among many others for related constructions in various languages). The DD, however, is not primarily dedicated to the expression of surprise or other such emotional stances, as it is perfectly possible to add to (1) the Hebrew equivalent to “… but I don’t care/give a damn”, or to embed (1) under ”It doesn’t surprise me that”:

(2) ze lo mafti’a ‘oti še-hu lo lakax li_{DD} ‘et ha-trufa!
   It NEG surprise me that-he NEG took to.me ACC the-medicine
   'It doesn’t surprise me that he didn’t take his medicine.’

Our account for grasping the semantics of the DD, to be developed below, traces the source of this undocumented mirativity effect to a particular discourse update where the state of affairs denoted by the prejacent is not compatible with a set of background objective norms, and therefore is expected not to occur. This contrasts with previous accounts of similar such effects (see inter alia DeLancey 1997, 2001, Aikhenvald 2004, Rett 2009 Peterson 2013, Rett & Murray 2013), which rely on the analysis that the state of affairs denoted by the prejacent is not part of a contextually available set of the speaker’s personal expectations, and therefore not expected to occur. For Rett (2011) and Rett & Murray (2013), the addition of a mirative expression to a proposition p conveys that p was not previously in the speaker’s expectation-set. In our case, p can still be in the speaker's expectation-set. It is only crucial
that from a normative point of view it was expected that \( \neg p \). Consequently, an additional contribution of the proposed paper is to enrich the inventory of linguistic expressions, which are cross-linguistically described as having mirativity effects, and provide a way to understand their source.

**Analysis.** Following the basic lines of what is called the classic model of conversation, assertions stand against a set of background knowledge, shared by the conversational participants and rule out certain possible world-states as not obtaining. A successful assertion ends with a new proposition admitted into the set of shared background knowledge. Assertions, accordingly, narrow the set of world-states (‘the context set’) that remain compatible with what has been presupposed or established. This set of world-states is the Common Ground (CG) shared by the conversational participants. This model, however, captures only assertions and presuppositions, which are sets of possible worlds that are either part of the CG or not. The notion of an exception, however, requires a mechanism that allows certain propositions to have a double status: on the one hand, to be asserted as true, and on the other hand, to be set of worlds that are not a sub-set of the set of worlds that constitute those of the background accepted assumptions. Thus, conversations also rely on the acceptance of various modal (epistemic, stereotypical, and deontic) generalizations. These generalizations allow prospects as to which possible worlds should obtain. Thus, we propose to divide the CG into two sets of worlds, those consistent with previous assertions and their presuppositions (CG\(_A\)) and those consistent with generalizations (CG\(_G\)):

(3) The CG\(_G\) is a set, which contains possible worlds that are consistent with various generalizations, without exceptions.

Consequently, we suggest the following definition for the DD, capturing the notion of exception:

(4) \[ \text{DD} = \lambda p \cdot \lambda w \forall w' \in \text{Epi}_{ep}(w) (p \notin \text{CG}_G w') \]

In all the speaker’s epistemically accessible worlds w’ that conform to the speaker’s knowledge in w (and assumed by him to be part of the common knowledge), it holds that the proposition in question is not in the CG\(_G\).

[[DD]]\(^\theta\) takes a proposition with its truth value and never alters it (see 5 below); thus, as a discourse management device, the only new contribution of the DD is an additional indication about the status of the proposition with respect to the CG\(_G\), namely that this set of worlds does not intersect with CG\(_G\). Discourse management devices only indicate the status of \( p \) with respect to both parts of the CG, thus the part before the “.” in the formula indicates felicity. By knowledge, we mean epistemic knowledge that derives from various generalizations, stated as universals in the CG\(_G\), about \( w \).

The generalizations, relevant for the phenomenon of the DD, are normative from the perspective of the speaker, in the broader sense of the term, capturing what is considered to be the normal or the appropriate way of doing something or what normally happens. Thus, the nature of such generalizations can be either deontic or stereotypical (for example, the generalization, against which the prejacent of (1) is made, is deontic). In other words, CG\(_A\) is a set of worlds consistent with the positive statements, assumed or asserted in the conversation; while the CG\(_G\) is a set of worlds consistent with the normative statements assumed in the conversation. Consequently, these generalizations should be modelled as all the speaker’s epistemically accessible worlds w’ that conform to the speaker’s knowledge in w, and assumed by him to be part of the common knowledge of all given interlocutors, about what is the normative state-of-affairs. Such generalizations are related to generics (characterizing sentences) if
those are analyzed as modals, expressing normativity, and as such containing universal quantifiers over possible worlds (inter alia Asher and Morreau 1995). These general statements must be different from generics if the latter are defined as a certain type of assertions about the actual world, in such a way as to allow for exceptions, since as such they are part of the CG\textsubscript{A} (cf. Krifka et al. 1995, Cohen 2004, Greenberg 2007, Deo & Madiman 2014 inter alia).

**Support for (4).** (A) DDs do not affect truth conditions:

(5) hu \ lo lakax li/lexa/lanu\textsubscript{DD} 'et ha-trufa!
he NEG took to.me/to.you/to.us ACC the-medicine
'He didn’t take his medicine. That’s weird!'

The referent of the DD can be either of the speech event participants. There is no truth conditional effect if the referent of the DD is changed. In this respect the DD radically differs from other non-core datives in Hebrew (Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh 2014, 2015).

(B) The CG\textsubscript{A} and the CG\textsubscript{G} must be disjoint: The DD is only felicitous when CG\textsubscript{G} entails \(~p\). Therefore, it is infelicitous when the CG\textsubscript{A} intersects with the CG\textsubscript{G}, or more precisely, when \(p\) is the set of worlds, which is a sub-set of the CG\textsubscript{G}. Thus, given a context in which it is expected that the patient will follow the doctor’s instruction, the DD is infelicitous in (6):

(6) hu lakax #li\textsubscript{DD} trufa
He took ACC the-medicine
Intended: ‘He took some medicine. #That’s weird!’

(C) The DD operates on a proposition: Being a discourse management device the DD always scopes above negation. Since negation is part of the proposition, and as such it is evaluated with respect to the CG\textsubscript{G}, and this is precisely the case in example (1). Consider the affirmative version of (1):

(7) hu lakax li\textsubscript{DD} 'et ha-trufa
he took ACC the-medicine
‘He took his medicine. That’s weird!’

The use of the DD in this case is felicitous in a context where the generalization is that he should not take his medicine, if e.g. he finished his dosage, or is allergic to its ingredients. This is not a trivial observation. As Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh (2015) note, other types of non-core datives can scope below negation as well. In particular, in the case of the Affected Dative the datival expression can be part of the negated event or attach above it, enabling two types of readings: being affected by the non-occurrence of the event, or negating that there was an affecting event.

**Further substantiation.** Being a discourse management device the DD is not expected to occur in embedded clauses, which indeed seems to be the case:

(8) dani yada Še-hu \ lo lakax #li/lexa/lanu\textsubscript{DD} 'et ha-trufa
Dani knew that- he NEG took to.me/to.you/to.us ACC the-medicine
‘Dani knew that he didn’t take his medicine, (#which is weird).’

The DD is not felicitous in polar interrogatives clauses. This is expected under the present account, since if it is unknown whether \(p\) or not-\(p\) it cannot be established whether the CG\textsubscript{A} intersects or not with the CG\textsubscript{G}.

(9) #hu lakax li/lexa/lanu\textsubscript{DD} 'et ha-trufa?
he took ACC the-medicine
‘Did he take his medicine?’ (Intended: contrary to what a person like him should do in a similar situation)
Interrogatives with DDs can only be felicitous as rhetorical questions.

Imperatives with DDs present defiance and do not function as typical imperatives expressing orders or requests:

(10) A. li 'eyn be'aya 'im tinokot!
   to.me not.exist problem with babies
   ‘I don’t have a problem with babies!’

   B. šmor li_DD 'al tinok šavu’a, ve-'az nire 'otxa!
   take.care.IMP to.me on baby week, and-then 1PL.see.FUT you
   ‘Go ahead, take care of a baby for a week, and then we’ll see you
   (talk).’

(10B) is paraphrasable as: ‘I dare you to go against the generalization’, where the prospective occurrence is contrary to the generalization that holds in the CG, whereby babies are such that it is difficult to take care of them.

Selected References


Peterson, Tyler. 2013. “Rethinking Mirativity: The Expression and Implication of Surprise”. [http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2FkYTg4O/RethinkingMirativity.pdf](http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2FkYTg4O/RethinkingMirativity.pdf)


